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Chapter 9

Originalism, Stare Decisis, and Constitutional
Authority
Christopher J. Peters

Abstract This chapter examines the relationship among three normative questions about American constitutional law: How should the Constitution be interpreted? When may (or should) the Supreme Court overrule its own constitutional
precedents? And why is the Constitution binding at all? The author begins by deconstructing the “special difficulty” with stare decisis that proponents of originalist interpretation often perceive. That difficulty, the author contends, can be explained only by reference to some underlying normative theory of constitutional
authority―of why the Constitution binds us in the first place. The author then assesses four extant accounts of constitutional authority to determine whether any of
them implies both originalism and a distrust of stare decisis. While three such accounts (Values Imposition, Consent, and Moral Guidance) may support originalism and reject stare decisis, none of these accounts is plausible. A fourth account
(Dispute Resolution) is more plausible but implies neither strong originalism nor a
rejection of stare decisis. Neither originalism nor distrust of precedent, therefore,
appears to be supported by a plausible account of constitutional authority.
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1 Originalism and Stare Decisis: An Introductory Puzzle
“[O]riginalism … seem[s] to have a special difficulty with precedent” (Barnett
2006, 257). This is the diagnosis offered by Randy Barnett, an influential theorist
of American constitutional law and a self-professed originalist. It is a diagnosis
that is hard to dispute. Over the past quarter century or so, as Barnett proudly (and
I think accurately) reports, originalism “has thrived like no other approach to interpretation” in American constitutional theory and practice (2006, 257). But with
its rise has come a vigorous debate within its ranks over the propriety of constitutional stare decisis—the Supreme Court’s presumptive deference to its prior constitutional decisions. Some originalists reject stare decisis in all or nearly all cases;1 others accept it halfheartedly and regretfully;2 a few attempt explanations, ofoften lengthy and angst-ridden, of why originalism allows for some allegiance to
precedent after all.3 When originalist theorists and judges get together to talk about
their ideas, constitutional stare decisis is among their most popular topics. 4
This is a chapter in a book about constitutional stare decisis, not about originalism or any other type of constitutional interpretation. But I hope to lend support to
the insight offered by Randy Kozel in Chapter 8 of this volume that the relationship between the two methodological issues is close and unavoidable. Originalism
is a type of answer to a persistent question in American constitutional law and
theory: the question of interpretive methodology, of how courts (or other interpreters) ought to go about the task of determining constitutional meaning in particular
cases. Originalism holds that constitutional meaning should be determined primarily or exclusively by reference to some meaning (“original intent” or “original
public meaning”) that existed at the time of the Constitution’s Framing. For its
part, stare decisis requires its own type of methodology: In the form that concerns
us here, it insists that the Supreme Court should decide constitutional cases in
ways consistent with its prior decisions, even if a current majority of the Court
now believes those decisions to be wrong. 5 Originalism’s “difficulty with precedent” arises from the fact that the two methodologies sometimes seem to conflict.
Deciding a case according to the original intent or original public meaning may
1

For example, Gary Lawson (1994; 2007) and Michael Stokes Paulsen (2003; 2005).
Such as Justice Antonin Scalia (1997b, 138-40).
3 Including John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport (2009b), Kurt Lash (2007), Lee Strang
(2006), and Randy Barnett (2006).
4 Two prominent examples are a symposium published in 2005 in volume 22 of the journal Constitutional Commentary and a panel discussion (later published in a book) commemorating the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Federalist Society in 2007 (see Calabresi 2007a, 199-252).
5 This question is of course distinct from other issues relating to stare decisis in constitutional
cases that will not be my focus here. These distinct issues include whether state courts and lower
federal courts within the U.S. system must adhere to the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions—the answer is a fairly noncontroversial “yes”—and the extent to which nonjudicial actors
(such as state or federal legislators or executive-branch officials) must adhere to the Court’s constitutional decisions, to which the plausible answers are more varied and controversial.
2
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require a different result than deciding it consistently with the (nonoriginalist or
otherwise incorrect) decision in a prior case.
I will take issue with many originalists, however, to argue that this apparent
clash of methodological commands alone cannot explain originalism’s “special”
difficulty with precedent. It is a clash, after all, that arises under almost any methodology of constitutional interpretation, originalist or not. In order to locate the
“special difficulty with precedent” that worries contemporary originalists like
Barnett, we have to dig beneath the surface of both originalism and stare decisis to
uncover what Kozel calls the “normative premises” underlying each practice. 6
Specifically, we have to look to theories of constitutional authority: answers to the
questions of whether, and on what grounds, those supposedly subject to constitutional law have an obligation to obey it. Only by uncovering the accounts of constitutional authority that might motivate originalism can we understand why, or
whether, originalism and stare decisis really do not mix.
I have three primary aims for this chapter. First, I want to bolster the case made
by Kozel that constitutional stare decisis cannot be understood or evaluated in a
vacuum; its propriety and its implementation can only be assessed alongside the
question of how the Constitution ought to be interpreted. Second, picking up the
hints dropped by Kozel, I want to demonstrate that answers to questions of constitutional methodology—including how the Constitution should be interpreted and
whether erroneous interpretations should be obeyed—ultimately depend on how
we answer the foundational question of whether the Constitution has any authority
over us at all. And third, I want to suggest, at least as a prima facie matter, that the
various accounts of constitutional authority offered or assumed by contemporary
originalists cannot in fact explain originalism’s “special difficulty” with stare decisis.
I begin in the next Part by exploring this supposed “special difficulty” in more
depth. I suggest that the difficulty is not so “special”—not unless there are hidden
normative motivations underlying originalism that are not apparent on its surface.
In Part 3, using Randy Barnett’s provocative defense of originalism as a template,
I argue that the normative underpinnings of originalism, or of any interpretative
methodology, ultimately must take the form of some account of why the Constitution is authoritative in the first place. Then, in Parts 4 through 7, I assess the three
basic accounts of constitutional authority most often relied upon (often implicitly)
by contemporary originalists. Each of these accounts, I contend, turns out to be
implausible as a justification of the Constitution’s authority, though for reasons
that vary widely with each account. In Part 8, I describe an alternative type of account that might avoid the problems of these others but that is unlikely either to
support strong originalism or to condemn stare decisis. Part 9 is a brief conclusion.

6

See Kozel’s discussion in Chapter 8, Part 4.2.

4

C. J. Peters

2 Originalism’s “Special Difficulty with Precedent”
Originalism, in its currently fashionable version, holds that constitutional meaning
should be determined primarily or exclusively by reference to how the text of the
Constitution was understood by the public at the time of its Framing. 7 Barnett
(2006, 258-59) offers a syllogism to explain why those who endorse an originalist
answer to the question of interpretive methodology also ought to give a skeptical
answer to the question of constitutional stare decisis:8
(1) Originalism amounts to the claim that the meaning of the Constitution should remain
the same until it is properly changed.
(2) None of the three branches of government on whom the written Constitution imposes
limits should be able to alter these limitations, either alone or in combination, without
properly amending the Constitution in writing.
(3) For this reason, the Supreme Court cannot change the Constitution which it is sworn
to uphold and enforce.
(4) Were the Court mistakenly to decide a case that adopts an interpretation that
contradicts the original meaning of the text, and this mistake was entrenched by the
doctrine of precedent, then the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the text would trump its
original meaning.
(5) In this manner, the doctrine of precedent is inconsistent with originalism.

Barnett’s syllogism, however, turns out to be subtly misleading. Barnett presents
the syllogism as a demonstration of the uniqueness of originalism—of why
originalism has “a special difficulty with precedent” that rival methodologies
don’t share. But in fact the syllogism points toward something like the opposite
conclusion.
Consider Barnett’s premise (1): “Originalism amounts to the claim that the
meaning of the Constitution should remain the same until it is properly changed.”
The difficulty with this premise is that almost all extant interpretive methodologies, including nonoriginalist ones, agree that “the meaning of the Constitution
should remain the same until it is properly changed.” 9 What the various methodol7

Prominent originalists who have endorsed this “original meaning” or “original understanding”
approach include Robert Bork (1990), Gary Lawson (1994; 2007), Antonin Scalia (1997a), Michael Stokes Paulsen (2003; 2005), Randy Barnett (2004; 2006), Kurt Lash (2007), John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport (2007; 2009a; 2009b; 2010), and Larry Solum (2008). There are
many variations within the general original-meaning approach, most of which are not relevant
for present purposes. Over the past generation or so, the search for “original meaning” has supplanted the search for the “original intent” of the Framers as the dominant variant of originalism.
8 Similar reasoning appears in Lawson (1994, 26-28) and Paulsen (2005, 291).
9 The possible exceptions are anything-goes pragmatism or straightforward natural-law approaches, which are not properly methods of interpretation at all. By pragmatism, I mean the decision of a constitutional case in a way designed to produce the best results, all things considered.
Richard Posner endorses something like this approach (Posner 2003). By a natural-law approach,
I mean the decision of a constitutional case in a way that accords with certain prepolitical moral
values. Arguably neither approach involves interpretation of the Constitution, because neither
has the goal of identifying the meaning of the Constitution itself (as opposed to the best result or
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ogies disagree about is what constitutes “the meaning of the Constitution,” and
thus what amounts to a “proper change” in that meaning. “Original meaning”
originalists define “the meaning of the Constitution” as what the public at the time
of the Framing understood its text to mean; “original intent” originalists define
constitutional meaning as what (some group of) constitutional Framers intended it
to mean; purposivists define constitutional meaning as what best serves the goals
that can fairly be attributed to the provision in question; and so on. The operative
disagreement is about how to define constitutional meaning, not about whether
that meaning should be followed (virtually everyone agrees that it should) or
whether “improper” changes in that meaning should be allowed (virtually everyone agrees that they shouldn’t).
Barnett obscures this fact when he equates originalism with an insistence on
adherence to constitutional meaning. Originalism does not “amount to” such an
insistence; it shares that insistence with almost every other interpretive methodology. What originalism “amounts to” is a particular type of understanding about
what constitutional meaning is.
Once we recognize that most interpretive methodologies share with originalism
a commitment to identifying and upholding the meaning of the Constitution, we
can see that the problem of precedent is not the exclusive province of originalists.
If the Supreme Court gets the meaning of the Constitution wrong—as determined
by whatever method we adopt for identifying that meaning—then in some sense
the Court has “improperly changed” the meaning of the Constitution. Following
this incorrect interpretation in subsequent cases would only propagate the improper change, making matters worse. In this respect, as Barnett’s fellow originalist
Michael Stokes Paulsen (2005, 289-91) suggests, virtually every interpretive
methodology has a difficulty with precedent. 10 Originalism is hardly unique in this
regard.
And yet it is originalists who do the most hand-wringing about constitutional
stare decisis. Why might that be? As Randy Kozel points out in this volume, any
the requirements of natural law). These approaches would be “noninterpretive” in the sense famously described by Thomas Grey (1975, 706-10).
10 Paulsen (2005, 291) identifies the following exception: “a theory of constitutional interpretation that purports to regard judicial precedents as themselves constitutive of constitutional meaning.” Most such theories, however, recognize some determinants of constitutional meaning besides judicial decisionmaking alone. The theory of “common-law constitutionalism” propounded
by David Strauss (2010), for example, holds that judicial decisions should be justifiable as interpretations of the constitutional text. In a somewhat different vein, Bruce Ackerman (1991) argues
that the “codification” of a legitimate constitutional amendment can be accomplished by “landmark” judicial opinions rather than formal written amendments pursuant to Article V, 289-90;
but he insists that these codifying opinions must follow a lengthy process of higher lawmaking
that is politics-driven and that resembles the Article V process in all but name, 266-90. Both of
these influential views see (some) judicial precedents as “constitutive of constitutional meaning”;
but both of them also allow for the possibility of constitutionally erroneous judicial precedent
(for Strauss, precedent that is not a justifiable interpretation of the text; for Ackerman, precedent
that attempts to amend the Constitution without the discipline of the higher lawmaking process).
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theory of constitutional stare decisis must take account of both its benefits and its
costs.11 Do originalists have special reason to fear the costs of stare decisis, or to
deny or discount its benefits?

2.1 Originalism and the benefits of stare decisis
Let’s begin on the benefits side. There is a fairly well-established catalog of “rule
of law” advantages that might flow from adherence to precedent—predictability,
consistency, judicial economy, and protection of justified reliance chief among
them—the desirability of which, as Kozel notes,12 seems unlikely to vary according to one’s theory of interpretation. How important one thinks it is to maintain
consistency with a wrongly decided precedent, say, or to protect justified reliance
on that precedent does not appear to depend on why one thinks the precedent was
wrongly decided.
We might think interpretive methodology is relevant, however, in determining
whether these rule-of-law values come into play at all. Consider the question
whether a person’s reliance on a given (wrongly decided) precedent should be
thought “justified.” Suppose we can identify an interpretive methodology that is
both easy to apply and always productive of determinate answers. Anyone with
half a brain—or at least a half-decent lawyer—could employ this (mythical)
methodology to generate a clear, noncontroversial answer to what the Constitution
means in any given case. If such a methodology existed, justifiable reliance on erroneous constitutional decisions would become a thing of the past. It would be
easy to identify a constitutional decision as erroneous, and thus any reliance on
that decision would be unreasonable. Stare decisis, then, would be unnecessary as
a means of protecting justifiable reliance. It also would become unnecessary as a
means of promoting predictability, consistency, and judicial economy: All of these
benefits could be achieved by simply applying the perfect interpretive method to
generate correct constitutional results. Subsequent courts and litigants would not
need to rely on stare decisis to control or predict the outcomes of their cases; they
could employ the perfect methodology to rely directly on the Constitution itself.
Of course there is no perfectly transparent, perfectly determinate method for interpreting the Constitution. But perhaps originalism comes closer to this unattainable ideal than any of its rivals. If so, then a world in which originalism is the exclusive methodology would be a world in which stare decisis is, if not superfluous,
then at least substantially less beneficial than it is in our actual world. We would
not need to lean (nearly as much) on precedent to protect reliance, promote predictability, and so forth; originalism would (mostly) do these things for us.

11
12

See Chapter 8, Part 3.
See Chapter 8, Part 3.1.
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Could this be the basis for originalism’s “special difficulty with precedent”?
Perhaps originalists distrust precedent because their methodology makes it largely
unnecessary. And indeed originalists sometimes claim that their methodology is
more determinate than the alternatives. Among the earliest proffered grounds for
originalism in its modern era was the constraint of judges (see Scalia 1989; Bork
1990);13 this rationale implies that originalism is especially capable of imposing
constraint, by generating answers that are clear and noncontroversial enough to
embarrass any judge who fails to reach them.
The difficulty with this hypothesis—that the determinacy of originalism renders stare decisis largely superfluous—is that it finds little support in the realities
of constitutional practice. In our actual world, originalist methodology is neither
especially transparent nor especially determinate. David Strauss (2007, 218-19)
helpfully classifies the troubles here into three categories: “the problem of ascertainability, which is simply the difficulty of doing the historical research needed to
figure out what the original understandings were”; “the problem of indeterminacy,” that is, the risk that members of the Framing generation had “different understandings about what the words have committed the document to”; and “the problem of translation,” or the difficulty of applying the particular understandings of
the Framing generation to modern circumstances they could not have foreseen. An
originalist interpreter must, first, locate relevant historical evidence regarding
what the appropriate collection of people alive at the time of the Framing thought
or intended the Constitution’s words to mean (and in so doing must decide what
evidence is relevant, which collection of people is appropriate, and what understandings or beliefs or other mental states of those people matter). She must then
determine whether some of the relevant mental states of some of the people in
question are in conflict and, if so, what to do about it. And she must, finally, figure
out how to apply those mental states—which were formed with reference to facts
as they existed in the late 18th or mid-19th centuries—to the very different and unforeseen facts as they exist today.
It is implausible to think that this process will very often be easy, or that it will
very often generate anything like a clear and noncontroversial result. We might be
forgiven, in fact, for accusing Justice Scalia of understatement when he admits
that originalist methodology “is always difficult and sometimes inconclusive”
13

The “judicial constraint” rationale is of course not original with modern originalists. Chief Justice Taney famously deployed it in his infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,
4050, the 1857 decision holding that African slaves, former slaves, and their descendents could
never be citizens of the United States and that Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery in the
territories:
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-making
power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the
court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on
the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when
it was adopted.
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(Scalia 1989, 84). And we are unlikely to take any comfort in the track record of
originalism as actually employed by judges or other interpreters. Consider, for example, the Court’s recent Second Amendment case District of Columbia v. Heller,
in which Justice Scalia writing for the Court used originalist methodology to discover an individual right to bear arms, while Justices Stevens and Breyer in dissent each employed originalist interpretation to reject such a right. 14
Or consider the controversy over whether Brown v. Board of Education, an explicitly nonoriginalist decision,15 can be defended on originalist grounds. Although
a number of prominent originalists believe that it can (see McGinnis and Rappaport 2009b, 842; Barnett 2006, 260), all of them rely primarily on a single article by law professor (and one-time federal judge) Michael McConnell (1995) that
makes this case.16 That article swims upstream against a strong consensus of historical and legal scholarly opinion (see Klarman 1995; Berger 1977; Avins 1967;
Bickel 1955) and, revealingly, it appears to employ the now out-of-vogue “original intent” approach rather than the “original meaning” methodology favored by
the current originalists who cite it. In any event, as David Strauss (2005, 304-05)
notes, whether McConnell is right or wrong is beside the point: The very existence
of the controversy affirms the Brown Court’s conclusion that the originalist evidence is “inconclusive” and thus undermines any claim that originalism is an especially determinate methodology.

2.2 Originalism and the costs of stare decisis
On the benefits side, then, it is quite unlikely that originalism renders stare decisis
superfluous. But what about its costs? Perhaps the costs of obedience to erroneous
precedent are, from an originalist perspective, exceptionally high.
As with benefits, any supposed correspondence between the methodology that
tells us a precedent is erroneous and the costs of obeying that precedent appears

14

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 572-636 (2008) (Scalia, J., for the Court);
554 U.S. at 636-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 554 U.S. at 681-723 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 After an initial argument in Brown, 341 U.S. 141 (1953), the Court requested rebriefing and
reargument regarding “the understanding of the framers of [the Fourteenth] Amendment” on the
question of school segregation. See Urofsky & Finkelman (2011b), 859-60. In its unanimous decision, however, the Court declared that the evidence of original intent was “inconclusive,”
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954), and elected to resolve the question “in
light of [the] full development [of public education] and its present place in American life” rather
than by “turn[ing] the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted,” 347 U.S. at 49293.
16 McConnell also wrote several shorter articles echoing the same arguments, which originalists
often cite in addition to the principal article. Some pro-Brown originalists also cite as support an
article by Akhil Amar (2000), but as David Strauss (2005, 304 note 10) notes, Amar relies primarily “on the text of the Constitution, rather than the original understandings.”
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tenuous at best. (On this point I disagree somewhat with Kozel. 17) If an originalist
uses her approach to determine that, say, Plessy v. Ferguson18 was wrongly decided, and a nonoriginalist uses his approach to reach the same conclusion, both interpreters will have identified an incorrectly decided constitutional precedent, with
whatever attendant harms (substantive injustice, political illegitimacy, distortion
of constitutional doctrine) follow from continued obedience to that incorrect decision. The nature and degree of these harms does not seem contingent on why the
precedent was incorrect. If originalism were an especially determinate methodology, we might worry about a special cost to judicial integrity from obedience to incorrect precedent: A Court seen as following a clearly erroneous precedent might,
for that reason, lose the respect of the public and the other branches of government. But originalism, as I’ve argued, cannot make things nearly this clear.
Of course, different interpretive methodologies often will produce different
conclusions about whether a given precedent is erroneous. Originalists almost
universally disagree with the Court’s recognition of an abortion right in Roe v.
Wade,19 for example, while many nonoriginalists think Roe was correctly decided.
This raises the possibility that originalism will identify more erroneous precedents
than nonoriginalism will. And indeed originalists sometimes allude to the fact that
their approach, if followed, “would seemingly lead to the rejection of many of the
landmark cases most treasured by constitutional law professors, and even by the
general public” (Barnett 2006, 259-60). Many of these cases, after all, were decided on nonoriginalist grounds, Brown and Roe being leading examples. If these decisions can’t be justified by originalist methods, then originalists will see them as
incorrect constitutional interpretations with all their associated harms, even if
nonoriginalists would not.
The potential for originalism to upset much settled precedent may well explain
both the typical originalist distrust of stare decisis and the angst that distrust sometimes causes among originalists. Contemporary originalism gained steam in the
late 1970s and 1980s as a politically conservative device to critique progressive
Warren Court and early Burger Court decisions20 like Roe, Griswold v. Connecticut,21 and Miranda v. Arizona.22 As conservatives have gained power on the Court

17

See his discussion in Chapter 8, Part 4; see also my treatment of that discussion in the Introduction to this volume.
18 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court in Plessy held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit
legally enforced segregation according to race. Plessy was overruled de facto by Brown and its
progeny.
19 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20 Classic uses of originalism in this critical vein include Bork (1990), Meese (1985), and Berger
(1977).
21 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court held that married couples have a constitutional
right to use contraceptives, thus setting the stage for later “right of privacy” decisions including
Roe.
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over the past thirty years—first under William Rehnquist (appointed Chief Justice
by Ronald Reagan, a Republican, along with three new Associate Justices), then
under Rehnquist’s former clerk John Roberts (appointed Chief by the Republican
George W. Bush)—originalism has ascended along with them. And stare decisis
has begun to look inconvenient—an obstacle to overruling the nonoriginalist, progressive decisions of an earlier era.
But not all nonoriginalist precedents are anathema to originalists. Brown v.
Board of Education is Exhibit A for this phenomenon; as Barnett (2006, 260) puts
it, “if one had to choose between original meaning and Brown, most”—including
most originalists—“would choose Brown.” As I’ve mentioned, some originalists
try (unpersuasively) to avoid this particular conflict by concluding that Brown actually can be defended on originalist grounds. But Brown is only the most salient
manifestation of the difficulty. I doubt many originalists would be comfortable
with an Equal Protection Clause that did not protect gender equality, for example,
or with a Free Speech Clause that did not protect commercial speech, or with an
Establishment Clause that forbade only official state churches supported with tax
dollars; yet even the most creative originalists would be hard-pressed to anchor
these interpretations in the original understandings. So originalists typically cannot
be content simply to reject stare decisis out of hand; they must at least grapple
with the question whether erroneous constitutional decisions might nonetheless
bind subsequent Courts.23
Perhaps, then, originalism has a “special difficulty” with precedent because
originalism is driven by a desire for politically conservative results. Many progressive constitutional decisions were decided on nonoriginalist grounds; this explains the (politically conservative) move toward originalism. Overruling those
decisions requires evading or rejecting stare decisis; this explains the originalist
skepticism of precedent. The originalist problem with stare decisis is, on this view,
a product of its politically conservative underpinnings.
Of course, the notion that a theory of interpretive methodology, or a theory of
stare decisis, can be justified only by the pursuit of particular substantive results is
likely to seem intuitively problematic. In the next two Parts, I will articulate a
normative foundation for this intuition. For present purposes, the important point
is that there is nothing in the methodology of originalism itself that creates a
unique or exceptional conflict with stare decisis. As Randy Kozel argues in Chapter 8, a satisfactory account of the relationship between an interpretive methodology (like originalism) and the question of constitutional stare decisis requires looking beneath the methodology to its normative groundings. An interpretive
methodology can tell us whether a constitutional precedent was wrongly decided,
22

384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court in Miranda applied the Fifth Amendment to hold that confessions by criminal defendants can be admitted as evidence only if certain warnings were administered prior to interrogation.
23 It is revealing, I think, that most attempts by originalist theorists to accommodate stare decisis
would have the effect of upholding Brown (even assuming Brown was wrongly decided) while
overturning Roe. E.g., McGinnis and Rappaport (2009b); Lash (2007); Strang (2006).
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but it cannot, without more, tell us whether we nonetheless should obey that decision.
In what follows, I want to suggest that an understanding of constitutional stare
decisis—of whether, and why, the Court should obey prior constitutional decisions
it believes to be wrong—requires an understanding of whether, and why, the Constitution deserves obedience in the first place. It requires, that is, an answer to the
question of constitutional authority. Answering that question, I will contend, can
generate (or at least support) answers to the questions of interpretive methodology
and stare decisis as well.

3 Interpretive Methodology and Constitutional Authority
In the previous Part, I raised the possibility that originalism’s “special difficulty”
with constitutional stare decisis is a function of its conservative political underpinnings. Suppose this is true. Would there be anything wrong with it?
It is worth noting that originalists rarely defend their methodology, or their distrust of stare decisis, as means of imposing certain substantive political or moral
values. Instead, originalists typically advert to more abstract, relatively valueneutral goals—judicial constraint (see Scalia 1997a; Bork 1990; Scalia 1989),
promotion of the “public interest” (McGinnis and Rappaport 2007; 2010) or of the
“common good” (Strang 2006), preservation of “popular sovereignty” (Lash
2007;Whittington 1999). This apparent taboo hints at a recognition that tying
originalism to particular substantive values is somehow illegitimate. I will argue in
the next Part that such a recognition is supported by a sound understanding of constitutional authority. First, however, it may be useful to examine a prominent exception to the rule of value-neutral arguments for originalism. That exception is
the originalist theory of Randy Barnett.
Barnett (2004, 9) defends originalism as an implication of his account of constitutional authority. “The Constitution … is a piece of parchment under glass in
Washington, D.C.,” he notes. “Why should we pay any attention to it”? Barnett
agrees that, as I will argue in Part 4, this question cannot satisfactorily be answered with the notion that we have consented to be bound by the Constitution.
Instead, he contends, legitimate constitutional authority ultimately depends on
whether the system of laws established by the constitution is substantively just, or
at least “not unjust.” And he asserts that substantive justice consists of certain
“natural rights” that promote liberty (4, 52-86). “[I]f a constitution contains adequate procedures to protect these natural rights, it can be legitimate,” he says (4).
As it happens, Barnett argues, the Framers also believed in these libertarian natural rights and “incorporated effective procedural protections of these rights into
the Constitution” (53). The Constitution as created by the Framers, then, is legitimately authoritative, according to Barnett. And so to determine the meaning of
that Constitution, we ought to be bound by what it was that the Framers actually
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created. This requires interpreting the Constitution, in the first instance, by looking
for “the meaning [its words] had at the time they were enacted” (90).24
Barnett’s approach thus justifies originalism as a means of promoting particular
substantive values, in the form of libertarian “natural rights.” I will have more to
say in the next Part about this feature of his theory. For the moment, however, I
am interested in the fact that Barnett defends an originalist methodology as an implication of his justification of constitutional authority. Is this connection inevitable? That is, must the normative underpinnings of originalism, or of any interpretive methodology, ultimately reside in some account of why the Constitution is
authoritative in the first place?
As a conceptual matter, I think the answer is no; but as a practical matter the
answer is yes. One way in which the normative grounding of an interpretive methodology might be disconnected from the normative grounding of the law being interpreted is if that law has no normative grounding—if it lacks legitimate authority
altogether. Imagine, for example, a theory of the least-offensive way to interpret
the illegitimate diktats of an all-powerful despot. Where the law is illegitimate but
also unchangeable and unavoidable, the best we can do might be to come up with
the least-harmful way to interpret and apply that illegitimate law. We might then
say that the interpretive methodology is normatively legitimate even though the
law being interpreted is not.
But it seems unlikely that the interpretation of the American Constitution fits
this model. This is not (merely) because the Constitution seems more legitimate
than the commands of a despot. It is due, rather, to the fact that we could, if we (as
a society) chose, replace the Constitution through means that are peaceful and
democratic, even if they happen to be technically illegal (though they need not
be). The Framers, after all, substituted the Constitution for the Articles of Confed24

“In the first instance,” because Barnett recognizes that there will be no identifiable, determinate original meaning with respect to many constitutional questions (2004, 118-21). Where a determinate original meaning cannot be identified, Barnett supports constitutional “construction”:
the judicial creation of a constitutional meaning “that is consistent with its original meaning but
not deducible from it” (121).
I should note here that Barnett’s leap from the premise that the Constitution is legitimate because it protects natural rights to the conclusion that the Constitution must be interpreted according to its original meaning is too hasty, for at least two reasons. First, the (legitimate) Constitution created by the Framers might contemplate nonoriginalist interpretation. The use of vague
terms like “freedom of speech” and “due process of law,” for example, might be delegations to
subsequent interpreters to define constitutional meaning by evolving standards rather than according to original meaning. Second, if it is the protection of natural rights that gives the Constitution its legitimacy, then the best method of interpretation is the one that best protects natural
rights—even if doing so requires departing from original meaning in some instances (where, for
example, the Framers’ understanding of natural rights was defective).
We can put these objections to one side for present purposes, however. The important points
here are, first, that Barnett’s defense of originalism derives from his account of constitutional authority, and second, that Barnett’s account of constitutional authority hinges on certain substantive outcomes or values (“natural rights”).
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eration in this way.25 Even if the Constitution is not legitimate, its illegitimacy
therefore is avoidable. And it would be difficult to justify pursuing the leastharmful method for interpreting the Constitution if we thought the Constitution itself was illegitimate and thus not worth interpreting. If we thought the Constitution was illegitimate, the normatively justifiable thing to do would be to replace it
altogether, not to attempt triage by devising a relatively inoffensive way to interpret it.
Thus it would make little sense to attempt a legitimate theory of interpreting an
illegitimate Constitution. As a practical matter, we must believe the Constitution
itself is legitimately authoritative before considering how best to interpret it. But is
it possible that our reasons for thinking the Constitution is legitimate can be entirely independent of our reasons for preferring one or the other method of interpreting it?
I very much doubt it. Suppose we believe, as Barnett does, that the Constitution
is legitimately authoritative because obeying it tends to protect certain libertarian
natural rights. It would then make little sense to discern the meaning of the Constitution in a way that is not designed to further this purpose. The likely result of doing so would be to apply the Constitution in many situations in which its authority
is not justified.
For example, suppose we adopt Barnett’s natural-rights grounding of constitutional authority; but suppose we then choose a method of interpreting the Constitution that has a different grounding altogether (say, that it is the best way to constrain judges). It will only be happenstance that these diverse rationales—
protecting natural rights and constraining judges—converge to produce the same
result in any particular case. In some cases, perhaps in many, the goal of constraining judges will conflict with the goal of protecting natural rights. A constrained judge, for instance, might fail to strike down a piece of legislation that
impairs a natural right the Constitution was designed to protect. It would make
much better sense to tailor our interpretive methodology to our reason for having
and obeying the Constitution in the first place.
Here is a somewhat more theoretical way to make the point, with a debt to the
work of Ronald Dworkin. Constitutional law is a conscious human practice with
moral implications. We as a society have (and to some extent each of us as indi25

The possibilities of replacing the Constitution through peaceful democratic means are not limited to those delineated by Article V of the Constitution itself, which provides for amendments
according to certain procedures. We might, using non-Article V democratic procedures, decide to
discard the Constitution and (using non-Article V democratic procedures) draft and ratify an entirely new one. This is precisely what the Framers did with respect to the Articles of Confederation. Article XIII of the Articles required the approval of Congress and the unanimous approval
of each of the state legislatures for amendments. The procedure specified in Article VII of the
new Constitution proposed by the Convention of 1787, however, contemplated ratification by
special conventions (not the legislatures) in nine of the thirteen existing states (not unanimously),
and it did not require the approval of Congress. This is in fact the procedure that was followed,
albeit with the eventual endorsement of the Confederation Congress (see Urofsky & Finkelman
2011a, 12).
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viduals has) a choice whether to engage in it or not, and our choice to engage in it
implies a determination that the practice is morally worthwhile on the whole. In
determining how the practice operates—how best to interpret the Constitution’s
commands, for instance—we ought to consider the practice in its morally best
light and perform it in a way that is consistent with this moral vision. 26 Constitutional law purports to bind us in important ways, and if it is a morally justifiable
practice, that binding authority has a justifiable moral grounding. The way we perform a core aspect of the practice—interpreting the Constitution, that is, determining how it binds us in particular instances—therefore must reflect, indeed promote, that moral grounding. Constitutional interpretation must further
constitutional authority.27
It would be difficult to justify an interpretive approach designed to identify the
meaning of an unjustifiable Constitution, or to identify its meaning without reference to the reason the Constitution is justifiable. To put the matter concisely: A
persuasive answer to the question of interpretive methodology must follow from a
persuasive answer to the question of constitutional authority.

4 Constitutional Authority and Values Imposition
Which brings us to the issue of whether Barnett’s account of constitutional authority is in fact persuasive. The answer, I’m afraid, is no. The problem is that Barnett’s account is not really an account of constitutional authority at all.

26

This is essentially Dworkin’s understanding of the project of “interpretation” writ large. See
his lengthy discussion in Dworkin (1986), 45-86.
27 This is not to say that every feature of a practice like constitutional law must be justifiable by
reference to the moral grounding of the practice as a whole. Some features of a practice might
serve to effect side constraints rather than to promote the underlying purpose of the practice.
Consider the rule in ice hockey requiring players to wear helmets. Wearing helmets probably
cannot be justified by reference to the overall purposes of the practice of ice hockey (athletic
competition, entertainment, physical exercise). Some even think wearing helmets impedes some
of these purposes. The helmet rule, rather, is justified by the side constraint of preventing serious
injury while playing hockey.
There may be aspects of the American practice of constitutional law that resemble the helmet
rule in ice hockey in this respect, though I am at a loss to identify one. In any event, interpretive
methodology almost certainly does not qualify. How we interpret the Constitution is far too central to our practice of constitutional law itself to be justifiable solely or primarily by reference to
a side constraint. Constitutional interpretation is our means of determining how constitutional
law binds us, and binding us is simply what constitutional law does. It seems impossible to understand how the Constitution binds without also understanding why it does so.
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4.1 The concept of legal authority
The concept of authority is among the most elusive in legal philosophy. 28 For present purposes, we can think of authority as the capacity to impose a moral obligation of obedience. If constitutional law possesses authority, then those subject to it
(legislators, executive-branch officials, judges, citizens) have a moral obligation to
obey it. If it lacks authority, those subject to it may have reason to obey it—the
fear of punishment for disobedience, for example—but they lack a moral obligation of obedience.
There are three key operative distinctions underlying the concept of authority.
The first is between authority and mere coercion. If we attribute real authority to
law, we recognize an obligation to obey it even absent a meaningful threat of
sanctions for disobedience. As H.L.A. Hart (1994, 82-91) observed, our attitude
toward valid legal commands differs from our attitude toward the orders of an
armed gunman. We view the former as authoritative, as legitimately binding, and
thus as imposing an obligation to obey even without the teeth of sanctions. We
view the latter as illegitimate and thus as merely coercive, not authoritative.
The second key distinction is between the kind of obligation imposed by authoritative law on the one hand, and a garden-variety reason to act on the other. If
we recognize a law as valid, we treat it as more than just another factor relevant to
our process of deciding how to act. The facts that it is dark and rainy outside are
reasons to drive slowly; the fact that the law sets a speed limit imposes an obligation to drive slowly. While it is implausible that this obligation is absolute and indefeasible,29 it must at least have greater normative force than most other relevant
reasons for action.
A closely related third distinction, and the one most relevant for present purposes, is between a reason or obligation to act that is content-dependent and one
that is content-independent.30 A content-dependent reason is a reason to attribute a
certain moral status to an action—to conclude, for example, that the action is morally obligatory on the one hand or morally prohibited on the other. The facts that it
is dark and rainy outside are content-dependent reasons to drive slowly; they are
reasons to attribute a certain moral status (moral desirability, perhaps even moral
necessity) to the act of driving slowly. A content-independent reason, in contrast,
is a reason to take or refrain from a certain action regardless of one’s beliefs about
the moral status of that action. The fact that the law imposes a speed limit is a content-independent reason to drive slowly; it is a reason to take that action without
regard to whether we believe the action is morally desirable or morally necessary.
As this example suggests, legal authority requires content-independence. The
obligation to act that the law imposes on us must be independent of the moral sta28

For a thorough exploration of its problematics, see Shapiro (2002).
On this point, see Peters (2011), 33-36, 44-47.
30 For a clear explanation of content-independence, see Shapiro (2002), 389.
29
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tus we attribute to that action; it must be capable of obligating us to take actions
we (otherwise would) think morally incorrect or suboptimal or wrong, that is, actions we otherwise would conclude we should not take. If we have an obligation to
obey the law only when it tells us to do the morally right thing, then the supposed
authority of the law is illusory: Our obligation is to obey the requirements of morality, not those of the law. Only if we have an obligation to obey the law even
when it is wrong—even when it requires us to do something other than what morality dictates—does the law really possess authority over us.
This requirement of content-independence may seem rather abstract, but it has
real-world significance for the effectiveness of law. To see how, imagine that the
Constitution tells us to do something other than what we think morality requires.
Perhaps, for example, it commands us to afford due process to a terrorism suspect,
even though we think national security creates a moral imperative to imprison the
suspect without trial. If our obligation to obey the Constitution depends entirely on
the moral status of its content—of what it is telling us to do—then we will recognize no obligation of obedience in this case, or in any case in which we disagree
with its requirements. We will simply do what we think morally best in such cases—and the Constitution will fail to function as law.
A Constitution that fails to motivate obedience in cases of disagreement with
its commands would be a disaster. This is particularly true because constitutional
law is less susceptible than ordinary law to obedience through coercion. Legal
subjects might often obey sub-constitutional norms simply to avoid the consequences of being caught disobeying them. (I need not recognize the legitimate authority of the tax code in order to fear criminal prosecution for tax avoidance.) In
the constitutional context, however, it is very often unrealistic to think that disobedient subjects will be punished for their disobedience. The contested nature of
many constitutional norms frequently makes it difficult to say with any confidence
whether someone has obeyed them or not. Enforcement mechanisms, moreover,
are clumsy: In the United States, constitutional disobedience by government officials typically can be “punished” only by the blunt instrument of voting them out
at the next election or by the extreme and rare measure of impeachment and removal from office. And the entity that is the ultimate subject of the Constitution’s
constraints—the democratic majority itself—is immune even to these sanctions.
Effective constitutional law therefore depends largely on people’s willingness
to obey it in circumstances in which they disagree with its commands but face no
meaningful threat of sanctions for disobedience. Indeed, we can think of a constitution as an attempt to coordinate behavior in the face of disagreement. The people
subject to constitutional law will of course disagree on matters of substance—on
whether terrorism suspects deserve due process, whether reproductive freedom deserves protection, whether Congress may require the purchase of health insurance,
and so on. The purpose of constitutional law is to resolve, or at least to manage,
these substantive disagreements so that we can function with reasonable coordination as a society. Constitutional law can succeed in this function only if those subject to it will accept and obey its results—even when they disagree with them in
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substance. Constitutional law, then, must provide reasons to obey its results that
are not dependent on their substance. As Jeremy Waldron (2006, 1371) puts it,
“the point is as old as Hobbes”:
We must set up a decision-procedure whose operation will settle, not reignite, the
controversies whose existence called for a decision-procedure in the first place. This
means that even though the members of … society … disagree about [matters of
substance], they need to share a theory of legitimacy for the decision-procedure that is to
settle their disagreements. So, in thinking about the reasons for setting up such a
procedure, we should think about reasons that can be subscribed to by people on both
sides of any one of these disagreements.

4.2 The content-dependence of values imposition
We can now begin to see why Barnett’s theory fails as an account of the authority
of the Constitution. Barnett grounds constitutional authority—our obligation to
obey the Constitution’s commands—in the desirability of certain substantive results or values (his list of libertarian “natural rights”). On the relatively abstract
level of morality, such a theory cannot support the obligation of obedience it
promises. One’s obligation, on Barnett’s theory, is to obey natural rights, not the
Constitution itself. One then should do as the Constitution commands only insofar
as this will foster the protection of these natural rights. If obeying the Constitution
fails to protect natural rights, one has no obligation (on Barnett’s account) to obey
it.
On a more practical, sociological level, Barnett’s theory cannot motivate obedience to constitutional law. If one agrees with Barnett’s list of natural rights, then
one has a reason to do as the Constitution commands whenever doing so would
promote those rights. But if one disagrees with the rights on Barnett’s list, or with
the entire concept of natural rights; or if one agrees with Barnett’s list of rights but
disagrees, in any given case, that obeying the Constitution would promote them;
then one will perceive no obligation to obey the Constitution. Barnett’s approach
provides no reasons for obedience that, in Waldron’s words, “can be subscribed to
by people on both sides” of a disagreement about natural rights. And thus it fails
to justify constitutional law as “a decision-procedure whose operation will settle,
not reignite, the controversies whose existence called for a decision-procedure in
the first place.”
Barnett’s theory is an example—rare in its honesty—of what I will call a Values Imposition account of constitutional authority. Such an account attempts to
ground the authority of the Constitution in its supposed capacity to promote particular substantive values or results. As I’ve argued, the attempt inevitably fails,
because it is content-dependent, not content-independent. Values Imposition accounts attribute authority, not to the Constitution itself, but to the desired values or
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results. In so doing, such accounts fail to motivate obedience by those who disagree with these values or results.
Values Imposition accounts are rare; while Barnett’s is not the only example, it
is probably the least apologetic.31 And with all respect to Barnett himself, who is
one of our most resourceful constitutional theorists, the analysis in this Part suggests the reason for their scarcity. Values Imposition accounts cannot plausibly
support constitutional authority. And thus they cannot plausibly entail particular
methodologies of interpreting a (nonauthoritative) Constitution, or particular reasons to obey or not to obey erroneous judicial interpretations of the (nonauthoritative) Constitution.

5 Consent
Originalists sometimes point to the normative force of consent as a grounding for
their approach. And at first glance, justifying constitutional authority based on
consent seems more promising than a Values Imposition account. Consent might
be capable of providing a content-independent reason, perhaps even an obligation,
to act. Our consent is an exercise of our autonomy; by consenting to something,
we are asserting our capacity to plan our own lives. The power of consent to impose moral obligations can apply even when what we are consenting to is the subjugation of our own judgment or wishes to those of others. If I agree to allow my
spouse to choose the paint color in our kitchen, for example, I am consenting to be
bound by her decision, even if I dislike its substance. Less trivially, perhaps, by
purchasing a home subject to a covenant that allows a homeowner’s association to
make rules governing various issues, from the color of our siding to the content of
our garden to the amount of the maintenance fees we must pay, my spouse and I
are consenting to be bound by those rules, even if we think them burdensome or
unwise. There are of course many similar examples great and small.
So, if Americans as a people have given our consent to be bound by the Constitution, we might be bound even when we disagree with what the Constitution requires. In fact, we might be bound even if what the Constitution requires would
(otherwise) be morally wrong or suboptimal. The moral obligation created by our
consent conceivably might outweigh or alter the preexisting demands of morality,

31

The account offered by Hadley Arkes (1990; 1994) might be Barnett’s only rival in this respect. Unlike Barnett, however, Arkes does not directly address the question of the Constitution’s authority, and unlike Barnett, Arkes is not an originalist: He advocates direct resort to natural-law principles in constitutional adjudication. Other accounts that might be read to ground
originalism in Values Imposition are those of Richard Kay (1998) and Lee Strang (2006). Kay, at
least, joins Barnett in adopting a relatively libertarian understanding of the values the Constitution is designed to implement; Strang is less committal on this point, identifying the Constitution
with what he terms the “Aristotelian tradition” of pursuing “the common good.”
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just as my consenting (for example) to adopt a child imposes moral duties to that
child that would not exist without my consent.
Some prominent originalists have suggested that their methodology can be justified by this normative power of consent. Edwin Meese (1986, 102), who served
as Ronald Reagan’s second Attorney General and was an influential catalyst of the
burgeoning originalist movement in the 1980s, described the Constitution as “the
instrument by which the consent of the governed―the fundamental requirement of
any legitimate government―is transformed into a government.” 32 Following
Meese, law professor Steven Calabresi (2007b, 21) argues that the consensual authority of the Constitution implies both the necessity of originalist interpretation
and the illegitimacy of stare decisis:
[I]t is only the text of the written Constitution to which we the people of the United States
have given our consent. The people have never consented to be governed in a formal way
by the five hundred volumes of the U.S. Reports [which contain the text of Supreme Court
decisions]. We know from the Declaration of Independence that a fundamental precept of
our constitutional order is that governments are instituted and dissolved by the people and
that legitimate government requires the consent of the governed. The American people
have consented to be governed by the Constitution, but they have not consented to be
governed by the Supreme Court’s decisional case law.

To similar effect are theories, like those of Keith Whittington (1999) and Kurt
Lash (2007), that ground originalism in the consensualist notion of “popular sovereignty.” “By construing the Constitution in terms of the intent of its creators,”
Whittington (1999, 111) writes, “originalism … enforces the authoritative decision of the people acting as sovereign.”
Because it purports to identify a content-independent obligation to act, what I
will call a Consent account avoids the conceptual failure of a Values Imposition
account as a justification of constitutional authority. But a Consent account fails
for another reason: Its descriptive precondition—the existence of actual consent—
has not plausibly been met in contemporary America, and probably cannot plausibly be met in any reasonably complex modern society.
To see why, we can start with the observation that the first three words of the
Constitution, “We the People,” are a fiction. 33 Even in 1789, when the original
Constitution took effect by its own terms, the electorate eligible to participate in
the ratification process was only a subset of “the People” as a whole, that is, of the
population that would be bound by the document. Slaves of course could not vote;
neither could women in any state, or those without property in many states, or free
32

Meese’s attribution of constitutional authority to “the consent of the governed” has a distinguished pedigree. Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall, two titans of the founding generation,
both famously described the Constitution as the consensual act of “the people.” See Hamilton,
Federalist No. 78 (1826), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Quoting the Declaration
of Independence, Lincoln (1946, 304) described “the sheet anchor of American republicanism”
as the principle “that no man is good enough to govern another man, without that other’s consent” (emphasis in original).
33 I owe this admittedly provocative but quite accurate phrasing to Randy Barnett (2004, 14).
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blacks in some. And even among those who could participate in the ratification
process, approval of the new Constitution was far from unanimous. A substantial
percentage of the American people at the time of the Framing therefore cannot be
said to have consented to the Constitution in any affirmative sense.
This consent gap is only compounded by what is sometimes called the “dead
hand” problem: the chronological distance between our own time and the crucial
Framing periods. No American alive today was alive when the original Constitution was ratified in 1789, or when the Bill of Rights was added in 1791, or when
the Reconstruction Amendments were added between 1865 and 1870; so none of
us could have given our consent to those actions when they occurred. And our
failure to amend the Constitution pursuant to the procedures specified in Article V
cannot amount to consent, because we did not consent to Article V either.34
It is true that some living Americans have expressly consented to be bound by
the Constitution. Naturalized citizens do so when they take their citizenship oaths,
and government officials are required by Article VI to swear or affirm that they
will “support this Constitution.”35 But this is a very small percentage of the citizenry. The vast majority of us have not given our express consent to the Constitution’s authority.
Of course, there are theories of tacit consent, like those of Rousseau (1954,
168), who located consent to be bound by law in the act of “residing within the
state after its … establishment”, and Locke (1960, 392), who found consent in the
“Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of … government.” But
these theories are unconvincing because they suppose a choice that, for most people, does not exist. Most of us cannot simply pick up and leave our homes, our
families, and our jobs to emigrate elsewhere; the costs of doing so would be prohibitive, or at least considerably higher than the costs of living under a Constitution to which we would not consent if given a meaningful choice. And where
would we go if we could leave? Except perhaps for billionaires who can purchase
remote private islands, most of us could move only to other extant societies with
their own existing systems of government, which may or may not be preferable on
the whole to the one we are considering leaving. Valid consent requires the option
to withhold consent, to say “no” (see Barnett 2004, 16-17); but for very few (if
any) of us is this a realistic alternative.
The idea that we have an obligation to obey the Constitution by virtue of our
consent, then, is implausible; “government by consent,” in the conditions of contemporary America, is simply loose talk. And it is worth noting that even if constitutional authority by consent were descriptively plausible, it would not provide the
34

On this point, see Siegel (2009), 1404-05.
On its most natural reading, the oath required by Article VI compels officials only to support
the Constitution while carrying out their official duties, not to obey it in other capacities. And
keep in mind that if an official has no duty to obey the Constitution generally, she has no duty to
obey Article VI’s oath requirement in particular. It is at least debatable whether an official who
has taken the required oath, believing that she is under no obligation to obey the Constitution,
would be subject to such an obligation simply by virtue of having taken the oath.
35
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strong support for adopting originalism and rejecting stare decisis that originalists
like Calabresi (2007b) claim for it. To imagine that we have consented to the Constitution is not to imagine that we have consented to an exclusively originalist
method of interpreting the Constitution. The system of government under which
we now live and from which we benefit (contra Calabresi 2007b) does in fact include the Court decisions reproduced in the U.S. Reports, and has since almost the
beginning of the Republic. And if we read through those decisions, we will find
examples of many different methodologies for interpreting the constitutional text
employed by the Court over the years, including but hardly limited to originalism.
(Indeed, the “original public meaning” version of originalism now popular is a
relatively recent innovation, having supplanted the older “original intention” variant only in the last quarter century or so.) It is difficult to see how we can be said
to have implicitly consented to one of these methodologies but not to any of the
others. As Reva Siegel (2009, 1405) writes, “[I]f we are to construe the living as
having implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding or arrangement, it
is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its many pathways of
change.”
Consent cannot plausibly underwrite the authority of the Constitution, and so it
cannot underwrite a particular methodology for interpreting it or a theory of
whether and when erroneous interpretations are binding. And even if it could,
originalism unadulterated by stare decisis would not be the result. If we are looking for a way to justify originalism, to condemn stare decisis, or both, we will
have to look elsewhere.

6 Moral Guidance
Many influential theories of constitutional law and judicial review, including some
originalist theories, imply a justification of constitutional authority that I will call
a Moral Guidance account. According to a Moral Guidance account, the authority
of constitutional law rests in its capacity to promote morally correct action, not in
a specific sense (as defined by particular moral values or outcomes), but rather in
a general sense—as an increased likelihood of acting correctly, whatever correct
action may entail in any given case.
As we’ve seen, constitutional authority cannot be built on the desire to achieve
particular (controversial) values or other outcomes; those who disagree with the
desired values would have no reason to acknowledge the Constitution’s authority.
But as Jeremy Waldron (2006, 1373-74) notes, we might be able to attribute authority to procedures we think are likely to generate good outcomes, even if we
can’t agree ahead of time on what those outcomes are:
Instead of saying (in a question-begging way) that we should choose those political
procedures that are most likely to yield a particular controversial set of rights [or moral
values or other outcomes], we might say instead that we should choose political
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procedures that are most likely to get at the truth about rights [or values, or outcomes,
etc.], whatever that truth turns out to be.

If we can agree that constitutional procedures are, generally speaking, more
likely to generate morally good outcomes (with respect to certain matters, at least)
than are ordinary democratic procedures, we might then attribute authority to constitutional law even if we disagree with some of the particular results it produces.
A useful analogy is the policy of subjecting children to their parents’ control until
they turn 18. We may not agree with every decision a given parent makes, but we
think parents are, as a general matter, more likely to make good decisions regarding the child’s welfare than is the child herself (or, for that matter, other potential
decisionmakers, such as the state). So we generally cede decisionmaking authority
to parents, knowing that we will not agree with how they exercise that authority in
every instance.
Grounding constitutional authority in the general capacity for moral guidance,
not in particular moral values or outcomes, can skirt the content-dependence problem that dooms Values Imposition accounts. Of course, Moral Guidance accounts
cannot provide a reason to obey constitutional commands one knows to be morally
erroneous; they cannot provide a reason to do the wrong thing. But they can leverage the ubiquitous fact of uncertainty about morality to create a reason to obey
commands one thinks are erroneous. The premise of Moral Guidance accounts is
that the constitutional process is more likely to generate morally good outcomes
than the alternatives.36 If one accepts this premise, then one has a reason to obey
even a constitutional outcome with which one disagrees. That reason is that the
constitutional process is more likely to have gotten it right, morally speaking, than
36

One can imagine a Moral Guidance account that depends, not on the superior quality of the
outcomes generated by the constitutional process itself, but rather on the quality of the outcomes
likely to be generated by a legal subject’s interaction with the constitutional process. The idea
would be that even if there is no reason to think the constitutional process is morally wiser (more
accurate) than the alternatives, a decisionmaker’s need to take account of constitutional commands promotes moral wisdom (and thus morally correct outcomes) by forcing her to question
the judgment she would reach were it not for those commands. This strikes me as a sort of
Burkean notion—an argument for a presumption against changing the status quo without some
strong, articulable reason to do so.
And indeed we need not stretch our imagination too far to conceive of such an account, as
Deborah Hellman’s “epistemic” justification of precedent-following in Chapter 3 of this volume
appears to be one, albeit in modest form. It is important to note, however, that Hellman’s account
is intended to justify only the presumptive force of constitutional stare decisis, not the authority
of constitutional law writ large. Her account is appealing as a justification (again, Burkean in its
character) of a default rule in favor of following precedent absent a good reason not to. But constitutional law writ large, unlike constitutional stare decisis (on Hellman’s reasonable understanding in any event), presents itself as an absolute requirement, not as a default rule. Our purported obligation to constitutional law is to obey it, full stop, not simply to follow it unless we
can think of a good reason to do otherwise. So this Burkean version of Moral Guidance is less
viable as an account of constitutional authority in general than as a justification of presumptive
precedent-following in particular. And I am not aware of any advocate of originalism who has attempted to ground that methodology in this kind of Burkean argument.
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the alternative decisionmaking procedures—including the exercise of one’s own
judgment. This reason for obedience stems from one’s own uncertainty about what
morality requires, and from one’s willingness to defer to the constitutional process
in cases of uncertainty. Again, parental authority is a good analogy: Even if we
disagree with a particular decision a parent makes about her child, our general
confidence in the comparative superiority of parental decisionmaking gives us reason to defer to that decision anyway.
Some influential constitutional theories can be read to attribute this sort of
Moral Guidance authority to the act (or acts) of constitutional Framing. Alexander
Hamilton, for example, suggested such an approach in Federalist No. 78 when he
elevated the “solemn and authoritative act” of creating a constitution above whatever might result from the “ill humors” and “momentary inclination[s]” of ordinary politics (Hamilton 1826). Much more recently, Bruce Ackerman’s (1998) notion of “dualist democracy” invokes a Moral Guidance approach in distinguishing
between the extraordinary participation and deliberation characteristic of “constitutional moments” and the rough-and-tumble of “normal politics.” These approaches seem to have in common a belief that something special about the Framing process—its broadly participatory scope, its deeply deliberative nature—
generates special moral wisdom that justifies our obedience to its results.
It is not difficult to see how this type of Moral Guidance account might underwrite originalism. If our reason for obeying the Constitution stems from the special moral wisdom of the Framing, then we ought to identify those judgments actually made by the Framers and apply them, so far as we can, to current problems.
It is the Framers’ judgments that contain the comparative moral wisdom that justifies obedience; the farther away we move from actual judgments of the Framers,
the more attenuated our reason for obeying the Constitution becomes. Nonoriginalist constitutional law therefore is not (authoritative) law at all; it has no
claim to our obedience. If we want constitutional law to be law, we have to interpret and apply it using an originalist methodology.
And in fact some originalists expressly ground their methodology in versions of
the Moral Guidance account. The most prominent example is the work of John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport (2007; 2010), who argue that requirements of
supermajoritarian approval, like those used to adopt the original Constitution and
those that apply to subsequent amendments, tend to produce rules that are conducive to the public good. This is so, McGinnis and Rappaport contend, because supermajoritarian requirements necessitate broad consensus and, given the difficulty
of amending the rules they generate, impose a sort of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”
that discourages narrowly self-interested rulemaking. Obtaining the benefits of the
supermajoritarian procedures of the Framing requires implementing rules actually
approved by those procedures—that is, it requires originalist methodology.37
37

Note that the particulars of the Moral Guidance account in question seem likely to determine
the type of originalist methodology that should be used. If we attribute the special moral wisdom
of the Framing to characteristics of the overall process, as Hamilton, Ackerman, and McGinnis
and Rappaport seem to do—to its participatory and deliberative nature, for example, or to the su-
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A Moral Guidance justification of originalism might deflect the contentdependence problem of a Values Imposition account, as I’ve explained. And Moral Guidance seems more plausible than a Consent account, at least as an initial
matter, because it does not depend on the problematic notion that most or all
Americans today have somehow consented to be bound by what the Framers decided generations ago. Moral Guidance accounts depend, rather, on whether the
process of constitutional Framing is the procedure that is “most likely to get at the
truth” about rights or other moral matters, in Waldron’s (2006, 1374) phrase. If the
answer to this question is yes, then arguably we would be justified in imposing the
results of that process even on those who have not consented to be bound by them.
Versions of Moral Guidance accounts that focus on the special capacities of the
Framing process, moreover, like that of McGinnis and Rappaport, seem capable of
underwriting the typical originalist distrust of constitutional stare decisis while also potentially tempering that skepticism in certain contexts. If the authority of
constitutional law resides in decisions made by the (comparatively wise) Framing
process, then any departure from those decisions undermines that authority. A
precedent that resolves a constitutional question without invoking the special wisdom of the Framing would lack legitimate authority, on a Moral Guidance account, and thus a subsequent decision following that precedent would lack authority as well. To follow erroneous precedent is to obey nonauthoritative law, and to
require that others (those subject to the Court’s rulings) obey it.
McGinnis and Rappaport (2009b) identify three possible exceptions to this
principle, however. The first is simply a case in which the costs of disregarding
precedent, measured in the familiar rule-of-law terms I described in Part 2.1,
would be disastrously high (834, 836-37). The second and third exceptions are derived directly from the particulars of McGinnis and Rappaport’s Moral Guidance
account and as such are more interesting. A precedent that was decided erroneously by originalist standards might nonetheless become so entrenched, McGinnis
and Rappaport acknowledge, that the precedent itself attains the equivalent of supermajoritarian approval, giving it a moral status roughly equal to rules generated
at the Framing (837-41). Even more intriguingly, McGinnis and Rappaport (842)
contend that some erroneous (i.e., nonoriginalist) precedents should be followed
because they “operat[e] to correct imperfections in the supermajoritarian [Framing] process” itself. As I explain in Part 7.1 below, the processes of framing the
original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Reconstruction Amendments
were saliently flawed in their exclusion of slaves and many free blacks, not to
mention women and some other classes of citizens. McGinnis and Rappaport sugpermajority requirement—then we ought to prefer the sort of “original public meaning” approach
favored by most current originalists. That approach, after all, seems most likely to capture the
superior wisdom in question, which flows (on this view) from the broadly public nature of the
Framing. On the other hand, if we attribute special wisdom to something about the Framers
themselves— to their extraordinary erudition or foresight or abilities as statesmen, say—then we
should look more specifically for actual intentions or judgments of those particular people (an
“original intentions” approach that is currently out of fashion).
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gest that if Brown v. Board of Education was incorrect on originalist grounds, 38 it
might still have precedential value as an “attempt to correct” one of these “defects” (the exclusion of slaves and other blacks) “by interpreting the Constitution
so that it has the content that appropriate supermajority rules would have produced” (841-43).39

7 Moral Guidance and Plausibility
Moral Guidance accounts avoid the salient objections that apply to Values Imposition and Consent accounts. But they come with their own baggage. The claims
they make about the superior moral wisdom of the Framing as a general matter are
subject to reasonable doubt, to say the least. In particular cases, moreover, those
claims will be especially vulnerable, for two related reasons. First, particular cases
often will involve issues that the Framing generation could not have anticipated
and therefore could not have used its supposedly superior wisdom to resolve. Second, the fact that a person subject to a constitutional command disagrees with the
substance of that command will serve, for that person, as a reason to doubt the
moral wisdom of the process that generated it, and thus to reject the command’s
authority in that case.
I will address each of these problems in turn, using the example of a hypothetical member of Congress, Cato, who must decide whether to obey the Constitution
despite his disagreement with its content in his case. Suppose Cato is asked to vote
for a bill that would allow suspected terrorists to be detained indefinitely without
38

McGinnis and Rappaport (2009b, 842-43) do not believe Brown was incorrect on originalist
grounds; but they assume it was incorrect for purposes of demonstrating their notion of “corrective” precedent.
39 While I mostly want to avoid critiquing particular justificatory theories of originalism, I can’t
resist noting that McGinnis and Rappaport’s maneuver here—validating nonoriginalist precedents that “interpre[t] the Constitution so that it has the content that appropriate supermajority
rules would have produced”—operates as a sort of bait-and-switch. McGinnis and Rappaport
justify constitutional authority on the ground that supermajoritarian requirements for making
constitutional law generally produce good outcomes; the idea is that there is something special
about the supermajoritarian process that generates wise decisions. For the Court to give the Constitution “the content that appropriate supermajority rules would have produced,” however, is to
substitute the Court’s own (normative) judgment—a judgment about what appropriate supermajority processes would decide—for the (descriptive) decisions actually generated by supermajoritarian means. The distinction is analogous to that between actual consent (a matter of descriptive
fact) and hypothetical or “constructive” consent of the Rawlsian sort (necessarily the result of
normative judgment). (On this distinction between actual and constructive consent, see Peters
[2011], 53-54.) Once the Court starts playing the normatively laden game of determining what an
“appropriate” process “would have” decided, it is hard to see why the Court should accept any
decision actually produced by supermajoritarian procedures if the Court finds that decision disagreeable. The disagreeable nature of such a decision, after all, would serve as evidence that the
procedure that generated it was in some way not “appropriate.”
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trial. Cato thinks the bill is good policy, perhaps even necessary for national security. But he also believes the bill would violate the Constitution’s guarantee of due
process of law. What reason does Cato have to obey the Constitution despite his
substantive disagreement with the outcome of doing so?

7.1 The salient defects of the Framing
On a Moral Guidance account, Cato’s reason to obey the Constitution is that the
Framing process was morally wiser than the ordinary democratic process of which
he is a part. Thus Cato is more likely to do the right thing, morally speaking, by
obeying the Constitution than by acting on his own judgment. But Cato will have
good cause to doubt the underlying premise of this account.
The generation that framed the original Constitution (ratified in 1788) and the
Bill of Rights (1791) tolerated slavery, and indeed affirmatively protected it in the
document.40 It excluded women, many people of color, and most non-propertied
people from the vote. It viewed Native Americans as uncivilized savages and
barred most of them from citizenship altogether.41 Whatever decisional advantages
might have flowed from the unusually participatory and deliberative nature of the
Framing probably will seem, to Cato, to have been compromised, if not entirely
negated, by these salient exclusions from the process. And the supposed moral
wisdom of those who did participate will appear suspect in light of their tolerance
(often their endorsement) of slavery, colonial genocide, racism, gender hierarchy,
and property-based oligarchy.
Now it may seem that a requirement that the Framing process generally be
morally wiser than ordinary politics sets the bar too high. A Moral Guidance account demands only that the Framing process be relatively wise with respect to
certain issues—namely those governed by the Constitution. But in fact this demand is more ambitious than it may at first appear. The Framing process, after all,
determined both what to include in the Constitution and what to leave out of it. If
Cato and the rest of us are bound by the Constitution, we are bound both by what
the Constitution contains—by rules like the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause—and also by what the Constitution does not contain, in the sense
that we are not free to give constitutional status to rules the Framers did not in fact
include in the Constitution. So, for example, when originalists criticize decisions
like Roe v. Wade for illegitimately “creating” or “expanding” constitutional rights,
40

Article I, § 9, cl. 1 prohibited Congress from banning the importation of slaves until 1808. Article IV, § 2, cl. 3 prohibited free states from emancipating or harboring escaped slaves. In addition, Article I, § 2, cl. 3 counted slaves as three-fifths of a person for purposes of congressional
representation (and therefore also representation in the Electoral College, see art. II, § 1, cl. 2)
and direct taxation.
41 Article I, § 2, cl. 3 entirely excludes “Indians not taxed” from the population to be counted for
representation purposes.
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they are claiming that the judges who decided those cases were disobeying the
Constitution, not by failing to implement rules it includes, but rather by implementing rules it does not include.
If Cato is to defer to the judgments of the Framing generation with respect to
the rules they included in the Constitution, then he also must defer to their judgments with respect to the rules they left out of it. Cato must defer to the Framing,
for example, on questions involving the rights to life, liberty, and property—
subjects unquestionably included within the scope of the Due Process Clauses—
and also on questions involving claimed rights to, say, education or health care,
subjects (arguably) not included within the scope of those Clauses. Cato must treat
life, liberty, and property as constitutionally protected, and he must not treat education or health care as constitutionally protected.42 On a Moral Guidance account,
this means Cato must attribute to the Framing a moral wisdom that is quite
broad—extending not only to the rules included in the Constitution, but also to the
choice of which rules to include and which rules to omit. It will not be enough, on
a Moral Guidance account, for Cato to believe that the Framing possessed superior
moral wisdom on issues clearly covered by constitutional rules, like the protection
of life, liberty, and property, or the freedom of speech and religion, or equality, or
the regulation of interstate commerce. Cato also will have to believe that the
Framing was comparatively wise with respect to issues not covered by constitutional rules, like education and health care.
Moral Guidance accounts thus make bold claims about the relative moral wisdom of the Framing. It is quite unlikely that the Framing can live up to these
claims, given its salient substantive misjudgments (the protection of slavery, for
example) and its troubling procedural defects (the omission of women, of many
people of color, and of most nonpropertied citizens). So it will take a very big leap
of faith for Cato to buy into the Moral Guidance account in the first place.43
42

The fact that Cato and others subject to constitutional law are prohibited from treating these
entitlements as constitutional in stature does not, of course, prevent Congress or other subconstitutional lawmakers from protecting them through statutes or other sub-constitutional
means. And I should make it clear that I am not assuming that rights to education or to health
care cannot in fact legitimately be found in the Constitution. These seem like plausible examples
of subjects “left out” of the Constitution, but there may be reasonable arguments to the contrary.
I use them here only by way of example.
43 In presenting the foregoing argument to various audiences, I often am confronted with objections along the lines of “But the Framers were extraordinarily wise, tolerant, cosmopolitan, etc.
in comparison to most people of their time.” While I’m not ready to accept the historical accuracy of this proposition on its face, I have no trouble granting it for the sake of argument. Even if
we assume that the Framers were comparatively morally wise for their time, that is beside the
point. The Moral Guidance account rests on the notion that the Framing process is comparatively
wise as compared to the alternative present-day decisionmaking procedures, including most relevantly the procedures of majoritarian representative democracy. Even if the Framers were wise
by the standards of their day, this fact does not establish (and in my view does not even serve as
evidence) that the Framing process is more likely to generate morally correct answers to the relevant questions than is contemporary democracy.
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7.2 The problem of unforeseen circumstances
But suppose Cato does accept the Moral Guidance premise that the Framing process, as a general matter, is morally wiser than he is (as a participant in ordinary
democratic politics). Cato still might reasonably reject that premise as applied to
his particular case.
In creating the rule embodied in the Due Process Clause—“No person shall …
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”—the Framing
generation, after all, could not have had the facts of his case in mind. Americans in
the late eighteenth century had no experience of worldwide terrorist movements,
the threat of nuclear or biological terrorism, the hijacking of jetliners for use as
passenger-laden missiles, or for that matter of a society anywhere near as ideologically, racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse as our own. Indeed they
could not have anticipated these developments with even the remotest degree of
accuracy. In requiring due process for the deprivation of liberty, then, the Framing
generation was not bringing its (by-hypothesis) superior moral wisdom to bear on
anything like the actual problem Cato now faces.
So even if Cato is inclined to defer to the judgments of the Framing as a general matter, he has no reason to defer to the judgment of the Framing as applied to
his particular case—simply because there is no such judgment to defer to. The rule
embodied in the Due Process Clause does not include a specific judgment about
how the facts of Cato’s case, unforeseen and unforeseeable by the Framers, should
be resolved.
To be clear, the problem here is not that there is no constitutional law on the issue Cato faces. Cato, remember, has interpreted the Due Process Clause to prohibit the bill he is considering. So we are putting to one side the indeterminacy issues
that might hinder the identification of “original meaning” in any given case. The
problem at hand, rather, is that the (by-hypothesis) applicable legal rule does not
reflect (cannot reflect) an actual judgment by the rulemaker—the Framing process—with respect to the particular circumstances confronting Cato. In enacting a
rule that covers Cato’s case, the Framers did not specifically consider Cato’s case
itself. In this respect, the Due Process Clause is no different from most general
normative rules: It applies in cases that its enactors could not have foreseen.44
Nor is the problem here the worry that the Framing process, had it actually considered these circumstances, would not or might not have resolved them wisely.
The problem is that the Framing process did not consider (could not have considered) these circumstances and thus did not resolve (could not have resolved) them

44

This is one cause of the phenomenon noted by Aristotle in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics:
that “all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement
which shall be correct.” General normative rules often produce “incorrect” results in particular
cases because those cases involve circumstances the rulemakers did not anticipate.
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at all. So Cato cannot know how the Framing would have resolved his case if it
had considered it. And he cannot defer to a nonexistent judgment. 45
Note, too, that this problem cuts in two directions: It afflicts both cases where a
constitutional rule applies and cases where no constitutional rule applies. In Cato’s
case, his obedience to an applicable constitutional rule (“No person shall … be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”) would not be
justified by the premise of the Moral Guidance account, because there is no specific judgment of the Framing to defer to in his case. But imagine a case in which no
constitutional rule applies.
Suppose, for example, that an originalist judge in 1954—call him Gaius—must
decide whether enforced racial segregation in public schools should be declared
unconstitutional; and suppose that Gaius believes that the original meaning of the
applicable constitutional provision, which provides that “No State shall … deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” allows school
segregation. By Gaius’s lights, there is no constitutional rule on the issue of segregation: The Constitution neither prohibits it nor requires it. 46
Nonetheless, Gaius reasonably might conclude that because the process of
framing the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the equal-protection rule, did
not consider (could not have considered) “public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation”47 in
1954, there is no actual judgment of the Framing to defer to. And thus Gaius
might decide to, in effect, disobey the Constitution by ruling that the Constitution
prohibits school segregation, on the ground that the Moral Guidance account offers no reason to defer to a nonexistent judgment of the Framing. Gaius’s disobedience would take the form, not of disobeying an existing constitutional rule, but
rather of enforcing a nonexistent one. 48
45

Of course, Cato might attempt to construct a specific judgment that the Framers might have
rendered had they considered the particular circumstances he faces. But now—as with McGinnis
and Rappaport’s (2009b) notion of “corrective” constitutional precedents (see the discussion in
note 39)—Cato has left the realm of descriptive identifications of judgments actually made by
the Framers, and entered the very different sphere of normatively infused imaginings of what the
Framers would or could or should have decided. Whatever comparative moral wisdom resides in
the judgments of the Framers has become attenuated and perhaps has been completely abandoned.
46 Or we might say, without affecting the substance of the argument, that there is a constitutional
rule allowing (but not prohibiting or requiring) school segregation.
47 This language is of course taken from the Supreme Court’s actual decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, 387 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954), in which the Court held that enforced racial segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause. One way to read Brown (not the only
way, and probably not the best way) is as an act of justified disobedience of the original meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause—disobedience, because the original meaning of the Clause allowed school segregation; justified, because the Moral Guidance account offers no reason to
obey the Constitution absent a specific judgment of the Framing.
48 Or (again) we might say that Gaius has disobeyed an existing constitutional rule to the effect
that school segregation is allowed (but not prohibited or required).
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We can begin to see now the serious plausibility problems that afflict Moral
Guidance accounts. Those accounts make ambitious claims about the general
moral wisdom of the Framing process, claims that are substantially undermined by
the salient moral errors and procedural deficiencies of the Framing. And they require a relatively specific judgment of the Framing in any given case, a judgment
that is increasingly unlikely to exist as we move farther away from the world the
Framing generation knew.

7.3 The problem of disagreement
Cutting across these two considerable difficulties is a third: A person subject to
constitutional law, like Cato or Gaius, will disagree with the substance of the Constitution in most cases that matter. A subject who agrees with what the Constitution requires in her case will of course simply do whatever that thing is; she will
not need to ask whether to obey the Constitution at all. Constitutional authority
(like all legal authority) makes a real difference only when a legal subject disagrees with the content of a constitutional command. 49
The problem for Moral Guidance accounts, however, is that a subject’s disagreement with a constitutional command also serves as a reason to reject that
command’s authority. This is because substantive disagreement constitutes evidence that the basis of that authority—the superior moral wisdom of the Framing
process—does not in fact exist.
Consider Cato’s belief that the terrorist-detention bill is morally good policy.
The Moral Guidance account tells Cato that, despite this belief, he should obey the
Due Process Clause and vote against the bill, because the process of Framing that
Clause was morally wiser than he (as part of the democratic process) is. But Cato’s moral approval of the bill is evidence, for Cato, that the Clause’s prohibition
of the bill is morally incorrect; and this in turn is evidence that the Framing process that authored the Clause was not so morally wise after all. Cato’s disagreement with the content of constitutional law thus gives Cato reason to question the
authority of constitutional law. And the requirement of content-independence—

49

The existence of a constitutional command also might make a difference where a legal subject
is uncertain about how to act: She might default to the action commanded by the Constitution.
Whether legal obedience as a default rule is an instantiation of legal authority depends on the
reason why the subject defaults to obedience. If she defaults to obedience for fear of sanctions
for disobedience, she is not treating the law as truly authoritative, as I explained in Part 4.1. The
same holds true if she defaults to obedience because the existence of the legal command serves
as evidence for her that the action commanded is the morally correct or best one; now she is acting based on content-dependent reasons (reasons to attribute a certain moral status to her action)
rather than content-independent reasons as legal authority requires. (Again, see the discussion in
Part 4.1.) Only if she defaults to obedience for some content-independent reason—a reason to act
that is unrelated to the moral status of the action—is she treating the law as authoritative.
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that legal authority be based on something other than the moral status of what the
law requires—is undermined.
I said in Part 6 that a Moral Guidance account cannot provide a reason to obey
constitutional commands one knows to be erroneous; Moral Guidance accounts
require uncertainty about the content of morality. We can assume for purposes of
the argument that Cato is afflicted by this uncertainty, and that most actual subjects of constitutional law share this affliction. This is not the same thing, however, as assuming that subjects of constitutional law like Cato typically lack strong
beliefs about the content of morality. It seems likely that most people in a position
to decide whether to obey the Constitution will, most of the time, have their own
views about what morality requires; indeed we should hope this is the case, as a
world in which legislators, government officials, and for that matter ordinary citizens typically are entirely at sea about what they ought to do would be a very
scary place in which to live. So we can assume that many or most decisionmakers
like Cato, while recognizing their own uncertainty about what morality requires,
will at the same time have beliefs about what morality requires, beliefs upon
which they would feel comfortable acting absent a constitutional command to the
contrary.
To believe that morality requires some action (X) is to believe that a command
to do not-X is morally wrong. If Cato believes, then, that morality requires X—
say, the detention without trial of suspected terrorists—then Cato believes that a
command to the contrary—say, the constitutional requirement of due process of
law—is morally wrong. Now this belief by itself need not convince Cato to disobey the constitutional command. Cato, we are assuming, accepts the premise of
the Moral Guidance account that the Constitution, in essence, is more likely to be
morally correct than he is. Cato’s acceptance of this premise might convince him
to disregard his (inconsistent) belief that the Constitution is, in this instance, morally incorrect.
But Cato’s belief that the Constitution is morally incorrect in this instance will
serve as evidence, for Cato, against the proposition that the Constitution is more
likely to be morally correct than he is. Consider again the analogy of parental authority. We can accept the premise that parents, generally speaking, are the best
decisionmakers about their children’s welfare while simultaneously believing that
a particular parental decision is incorrect. But our belief that a particular decision
is wrong will undermine our acceptance of the general premise of parental authority. If we perceive a particular parental judgment—say, the decision not to inoculate one’s children—as especially foolish, our confidence in the general principle
of superior parental decisionmaking capacity will be called into doubt.
And note that—crucially—we need not reject the premise of parental authority
as a general matter in order to determine that it fails in this particular case. We
may believe that parents are the best decisionmakers for their children in many
more cases than not, and even that these particular parents are the best decisionmakers in many more cases than not, while still concluding, based on this one
(by our lights) extraordinarily foolish decision, that these parents are not the best
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decisionmakers in this case. Our belief that a particular decision is wrong, in other
words, may convince us that this case is an exception to the general rule of parental authority.
The same possibility obtains with respect to Cato. Cato’s belief that the requirement of due process is morally erroneous in his case might lead him to question the underlying Moral Guidance premise of constitutional authority, namely
the supposedly superior wisdom of the Framing process. Or, less dramatically and
therefore more probably, it might cause him to reject the application of that premise to his particular case, even as he continues to accept it more generally. Cato
might conclude that because the Constitution (by his lights) is morally wrong in
this case, the premise of superior constitutional wisdom therefore does not apply
in this case. And so Cato might conclude that the Constitution simply does not
possess authority in his case; he has no obligation to obey its command.
Note, too, that the persuasiveness of this skepticism is enhanced to the extent
there are independent grounds to question the wisdom of the Constitution. And we
have already seen that at least two independent grounds are likely to exist in any
given case. The first is the set of reasons to question the plausibility of Moral
Guidance accounts as a general matter: the arbitrarily exclusionary nature of the
Framing and the saliently erroneous moral judgments made by the Framers. The
second is the unlikelihood that the Framers considered any given set of circumstances like Cato’s when they framed their constitutional rules. These grounds, in
combination with the evidentiary force of disagreement, spell trouble for a Moral
Guidance account. For the account to work, legal subjects like Cato will have to
accept its rather questionable premise of generally superior moral wisdom; they
will have to agree that this premise applies specifically to a given case the Framers
could not have foreseen; and they will have to do so in spite of their substantive
disagreement with the constitutional law in that case and their consequent doubt
about the basis for the law’s authority.
At bottom, then, the Moral Guidance approach is not a very persuasive grounding for constitutional authority. Part of the problem is context-sensitive: The salient moral failings of the American Framing are not inevitable features of any constitutional framing process. Nonetheless, they are features of the system we have.
And the other components of the problem seem more universal. No process of
constitution-making can envision every circumstance in which its rules will apply;
as a constitution gets older and older, this shortcoming will grow more and more
apparent. And every constitution must be capable of motivating obedience even by
those who strongly disagree with the substance of its commands. If the only
ground for obedience is Moral Guidance, then, constitutional authority often will
fail, in our system or in any other.
If a Moral Guidance account cannot persuasively justify constitutional authority itself, then it cannot persuasively dictate methods of constitutional interpretation or determine the propriety of constitutional stare decisis. Like Values Imposition and Consent accounts, it can explain neither a preference for originalism nor a
distrust of precedent.
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8 Dispute Resolution
Where, then, can originalists turn? In theory, the three accounts of constitutionality I’ve canvassed to this point—Values Imposition, Consent, and Moral Guidance—all might support originalism and reject, or at least cast doubt on, constitutional stare decisis. But none of them works as a plausible account of authority.
There is a fourth type of account available, which I will call a Dispute Resolution account. A Dispute Resolution account locates constitutional authority in the
capacity of constitutional processes to resolve, avoid, or mitigate certain kinds of
disagreements. Our reason to obey constitutional commands on this account is not
that we think the constitutional process is wiser than we are, but rather that deferring to that process will avoid some of the costs of disputes that ordinary democracy cannot resolve.
Dispute Resolution accounts seem more promising than their rivals as justifications of constitutional authority, for reasons I will briefly explain below. As I also
will explain, however, they can support only a selective, modest form of originalism, and they are likely to favor rather than distrust constitutional stare decisis.

8.1 Footnote Four
The most prominent example of a Dispute Resolution account in American constitutional theory is what we might call the Footnote Four account, so named for its
origin in the well-known footnote of that number in the Supreme Court’s 1938
Carolene Products decision.50 As later expounded by John Hart Ely (1980), the
Footnote Four account holds that aggressive constitutional review of legislation is
justified in two types of circumstance where the democratic process cannot be
trusted to decide issues fairly. First, those holding democratic power might have a
strong interest in consolidating that power by restricting the political process (by,
e.g., gerrymandering voting rules or penalizing criticism of the government). Second, democratic decisionmaking might be distorted by irrational bias against “discrete and insular minorities” defined by traits like race or religion (as with laws,
e.g., requiring racial segregation in public schools).
Footnote Four justifies constitutional judicial review as a means of preventing
or remediating these democratic dysfunctions. Well-constructed constitutional
rules might prevent dysfunction from occurring in the first place, by prohibiting
unjustified restrictions on political speech, for example, or barring unequal treatment based on race without a demonstrably compelling reason. And politically insular constitutional courts, protected by life tenure, might impartially resolve disputes over the application of these rules, determining whether a particular speech
50

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 at n.4 (1938).
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restriction or a given racial classification is justified. Citizens will be more likely
to accept constitutional resolutions of these issues than resolutions through ordinary democratic procedures, because they will see the constitutional process as
relatively fair and impartial.
Footnote Four thus implies a Dispute Resolution account of constitutional authority. It holds that establishing, obeying, and applying certain constitutional
rules will resolve some disputes better than ordinary democracy could resolve
them. A person’s reason to obey a constitutional command with which she disagrees, on this account, is that doing so will resolve (or avoid, or mitigate) some
costly disagreement that otherwise would not be so well resolved (or avoided or
mitigated).
As proffered by the Carolene Products Court and elucidated by Ely, the Footnote Four account emphasizes the impartiality of the judicial process relative to
ordinary democratic politics. But the focus of the account might be enlarged
somewhat, to encompass not just constitutional adjudication but the process of
constitutional framing as well. Just as federal judges in the United States are buffered from the self-interests and biases of ordinary politics by the device of life
tenure, so the Framers are shielded from those influences by the passage of time.
Because the Framers of most key constitutional provisions have been dead for one
or two centuries, they could not possibly have had a stake in the particular political controversies of our own era. Deferring to decisions made by the Framers,
then, might enhance the perceived impartiality of the constitutional process. The
“dead hand” problem that haunts Consent and Moral Guidance accounts is not a
problem at all on the Footnote Four account, but rather an advantage.
Thus enlarged, Footnote Four might be thought to imply some version of
originalism. I will have more to say on this point below. Allow me to note first,
however, that a Dispute Resolution account like Footnote Four seems capable of
avoiding the fatal flaws in the other justifications of constitutional authority I’ve
canvassed. Unlike Values Imposition accounts, Footnote Four offers a contentindependent reason to obey the Constitution, namely that doing so will resolve
certain disputes more effectively than ordinary democracy could. Unlike Consent
accounts, Footnote Four need not pretend that Americans today have consented to
be bound by everything the Framers decided; it requires only that most contemporary Americans accept constitutional law as a relatively fair means of dispute resolution. And unlike Moral Guidance accounts, Footnote Four is not undermined by
the obvious moral fallibility of the Framers, by their inability to predict how their
rules would apply, or by inevitable substantive disagreement with what the Constitution commands. Whether the Framers were morally wise or prescient is not important on the Footnote Four account; what is important is that the rules they devised, as interpreted and applied by politically insular courts, are more impartial
than ordinary democratic politics with respect to the issues they resolve.
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So there is some cause to believe that Footnote Four is a more robust platform
for constitutional authority than the other approaches I’ve discussed.51 But what
might the Footnote Four account tell us about constitutional interpretation and
stare decisis?
First, it might support originalism—but only selectively, and far from exclusively. Where the Framers can be seen as relatively impartial with respect to current controversies, Footnote Four suggests deferring to their judgments. If there is
a danger of power-entrenchment by a current democratic majority, for example—
laws restricting political speech, say—it might make sense to obey decisions made
by the Framers, who had no interest in consolidating the political power of a majority that would exist many generations later. On some constitutional issues,
however—race relations, for instance, or gender hierarchy, or religious tolerance—the Framers’ relative impartiality will be far less evident, to say the least.
Deference to the Framers’ judgments in these areas would not be justified by
Footnote Four.
Footnote Four, moreover, allows for nonoriginalist techniques where on-point
judgments of the Framers do not exist or cannot be found. This is because Footnote Four attributes relative impartiality not just (or even primarily) to the Framing, but also (and perhaps more importantly) to the adjudicative process. The
eighteenth-century Framers could not have considered the problems of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction when they authored the Due
Process Clause, but twenty-first-century constitutional judges can take account of
those phenomena in applying the Clause. If, as Alexander Hamilton (1826) suggested in Federalist No. 78, “the independence of the judges” insulates them from
the political self-interest that afflicts ordinary politics, then judges can apply the
Due Process Clause with authority, even if what they are applying is something
other than the particular judgments made by the Framers. The authority of their
decisions flows not from the Framers’ supposed moral expertise, but from the
comparatively impartial posture of the judges themselves.
So Footnote Four seems likely to reject originalism altogether in some circumstances, and to allow for nonoriginalist techniques where originalism is indeterminate. What about constitutional stare decisis? Footnote Four will be far more receptive to stare decisis than, say, the Moral Guidance account, and in fact it may
see stare decisis as a benefit. The Moral Guidance account derives the entirety of
the Constitution’s authority from the supposed wisdom of the Framers, and so if
the Court gets the Framers’ judgment wrong, the resulting decision lacks authority. In contrast, Footnote Four attributes some constitutional authority to the adjudicative process itself. Getting the Framers’ judgment wrong therefore is not necessarily fatal to the authority of a constitutional decision on the Footnote Four
approach. Indeed, “getting it wrong” according to whatever interpretive method51

Elsewhere I have described and defended at length a justification of constitutional authority
that might be considered an expanded version of the Footnote Four account (Peters 2011, 246348).
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ology the Court uses need not deprive the Court of its authority—so long as the
general perception of the Court’s relative impartiality remains intact. Adherence to
an “incorrect” precedent, then, need not be anathema on the Footnote Four account.
Indeed, adherence to precedent might actually bolster the Court’s perceived
impartiality (and thus its authority) on that account. Stare decisis can promote the
perception of impartiality by visibly preventing the Court from reaching its preferred result; this is the essence of the most-controversial argument in defense of
stare decisis offered by the plurality in the Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision,52 much discussed elsewhere in this volume. A Court that is seen to be following precedent is a Court that is seen as impartial to that extent. In this sense, stare
decisis might be an element of constitutional authority on the Footnote Four approach rather than an obstacle to it.

8.2 The rule of law
Footnote Four is not the only variety of Dispute Resolution account that might be
thought to support originalism. Originalists sometimes defend their methodology
as a way to promote the familiar rule-of-law values of predictability, consistency,
protection of reliance interests, and the like (see Solum 2008, 129). The notion is
that tethering constitutional interpretation to original intent or original meaning
prevents courts from reaching unanticipated or widely divergent results.
The rule-of-law values might be thought to justify constitutional authority on
Dispute Resolution grounds. The existence of clear, determinate constitutional
rules, as I suggested in Part 2.1, would avoid most legal disputes about the issues
covered by constitutional law53 and would make those disputes that do arise relatively easy to resolve. The dispute-avoiding benefits of clear constitutional rules
would, on this account, serve as a content-independent reason to obey them, thus
potentially justifying their authority. The familiar insight here is that sometimes it
is better for things to be (clearly) decided then for them to be decided correctly.
As an initial matter, however, it is doubtful that the rule-of-law values by themselves can justify any but the most bare-bones version of constitutional law. On
some constitutional issues, it may indeed be more important that the rules be clear
than that they be correct; the basic structural features of democratic government
(who makes the laws, who enforces them, who interprets them) come to mind.
Democratic government, or government in general, could not exist without these
literally constitutive constitutional rules. And indeed most of the foundational constitutive rules of American constitutional law are expressed with relative determi52

505 U.S. 833, 861-64 (1992).
Of course, clear, determinate rules would not avoid factual disputes about whether a constitutional rule has been violated in any given case.
53
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nacy in the text—rules like the qualifications to serve in Congress or as President,54 for example, or the means of electing those officials,55 or the procedures for
enacting legislation.56 Once a basic governmental framework is in place, however,
the government created by that framework is likely to be capable of fulfilling the
rule-of-law values reasonably well through ordinary legislation. Those values
themselves cannot explain why constitutional law should constrain that government beyond what is necessary to constitute it.
Even where these rule-of-law values seem capable of justifying constitutional
authority, they are unlikely to support either strong originalism or an outright rejection of constitutional precedent. This is because, as I noted in Part 2.1, originalism is endemically underdeterminate; rarely can it provide a clear, noncontroversial answer to a constitutional question. And while originalism might be no worse
(and in some cases might be better) than other interpretive approaches in this regard, the best way to enhance the determinacy of constitutional law is likely to be
the very system of stare decisis that many originalists distrust. Thomas Merrill
(2007, 226) identifies three reasons to think this is so. First, “the legal norms that
we apply in resolving disputed questions of law are much thicker if we look at the
universe of precedent than if we look at originalist materials”; it is much more
likely that the Court has addressed a particular issue, or a closely analogous issue,
than that the historical materials will reveal a clear originalist answer to that issue.
Second, precedent is more accessible to the relevant decisionmakers than is evidence of original understanding; Court decisions are published in publicly available, indexed, searchable reporter volumes, while “[t]he materials that bear on original understanding are vast, are frequently inaccessible, and in some cases are only
now being discovered.” Third, “the style of reasoning from precedent is much
more congenial with the skill set of the typical American judge or justice, than is
reasoning from originalist materials”; judges are trained as lawyers, not as historians.
Originalism’s “special difficulty with precedent” therefore cannot be explained
by reference to the rule-of-law values. More generally, a Dispute Resolution account of constitutional law lends only tepid support for originalism and cannot justify a thoroughgoing distrust of constitutional stare decisis.

54

See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cls. 1-2 (stating the qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives); art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating the qualifications of members of the Senate); art. II, §
1, cl. 5 (stating the qualifications of the President).
55 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, & amend. XIV, § 2 (stating the election procedures for
members of the House); art. I, § 3, cls. 1-2, & amend. XVII (stating the appointment (and later
the election) procedures for members of the Senate); art. II, § 1, cls. 1-4, and amend. XII (stating
the election procedures for the President).
56 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7.
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9 The Centrality of Authority
So where does the “special difficulty” come from? The accounts of constitutional
authority that answer this question are not plausible accounts. The accounts that
are plausible can’t answer the question.
The most honest answer might be the one given by Randy Barnett. Barnett
frankly defends originalism as a means of promoting the libertarian natural rights
he believes the Framers intended to protect. And he admits to ambivalence about
constitutional stare decisis, rejecting those precedents that fail to protect natural
rights but grudgingly accepting those that, like Brown, seem to correct the Framers’ rare moral mistakes.
While Barnett’s theory has the advantage of honesty, it suffers from the considerable drawback of failing altogether as an account of constitutional authority.
Barnett offers no reason to obey the Constitution to someone who disagrees with
his (or the Framers’) views on natural rights. But his theory is useful nonetheless,
because it casts in stark relief a fundamental truth about constitutional methodology. We cannot answer methodological questions without first deciding why the
Constitution binds us at all. Originalism and stare decisis are defensible only insofar as they reflect a defensible theory of constitutional authority.
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